(Download) "State v. Miranda" by The Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut ~ eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: State v. Miranda
- Author : The Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut
- Release Date : January 16, 2002
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 80 KB
Description
Argued November 2, 2000 Opinion This case returns to us for a second time. See State v. Miranda, 245 Conn. 209, 715 A.2d 680 (1998). In these certified appeals, the state appeals and the defendant, Santos Miranda, cross appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court on remand from this court. See State v. Miranda, 56 Conn. App. 298, 313-14, 742 A.2d 1276 (2000). The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the defendant's convictions on six 2 counts of the crime of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3) 3 deprived him of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. In his cross appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (3) and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53-21; 4 (2) his conviction of two counts of assault in the first degree; see footnote 1 of this opinion; violates the prohibition against double jeopardy under the United States constitution; and (3) his convictions for assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child violate the prohibition against double jeopardy under the United States constitution. We agree with the state's claim on appeal and disagree with the defendant's claims in the cross appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. The following facts and procedural history guide our resolution of these appeals. ''The defendant commenced living with his girlfriend and her two children in an apartment [in Meriden] in September, 1992. On January 27, 1993, the defendant was twenty-one years old, his girlfriend was sixteen, her son was two, and her daughter, the victim in this case, born on September 21, 1992, was four months old. Although he was not the biological father of either child, the defendant took care of them and considered himself to be their stepfather. He represented himself as such to the people at Meriden Veteran's Memorial Hospital where, on January 27, 1993, the victim was taken for treatment of her injuries following a 911 call by the defendant that the child was choking on milk. Upon examination at the hospital, it was determined that the victim had multiple rib fractures that were approximately two to three weeks old, two skull fractures that were approximately seven to ten days old, a brachial plexus injury to her left arm, a rectal tear that was actively 'oozing blood' and bilateral subconjunctival nasal hemorrhages. On the basis of extensive medical evidence, the trial court determined that the injuries had been sustained on three or more occasions and that none of the injuries had been the result of an accident, a fall, events that took place at the time of the child's birth, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, a blocked air passageway or the child choking on milk. Rather, the trial court found that the injuries, many of which created a risk of death, had been caused by great and deliberate force.